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ILLEGAL ELECTION PRACTICES IN PHILADELPHIA
Each qualified citizen has the right to vote and to have his vote counted
honestly; if elections are fraudulent, a citizen's vote is diluted or nullified
to the extent to which votes are illegally cast. In the following material, an
examination is made of the Pennsylvania election laws to determine who is
responsible for honest elections in Philadelphia, why illegal election prac-
tices continue to exist and what remedies are possible.'
In determining whether there are in fact illegal election practices in
Philadelphia, research was not limited to the relatively few convictions for
violations of the Election Code but included interviews with district election
officials, party watchers, election workers for a nonpartisan civic group,
committeemen, ward leaders, office holders and defeated candidates.2
ELECTION MACHINERY
For election purposes, Philadelphia is divided into fifty-two wards
having no uniformity as to area or population.3 Various combinations
of these wards form city, state and congressional districts for those elective
offices whose area of representation is based on population. Each ward is
subdivided into districts which range in size from approximately 800 to




The Election Code authorizes establishment of an election board in
each district to supervise the casting of votes.5 The board is composed
of an elected judge of elections, two elected inspectors of elections and an
appointed clerk of elections. Each party nominates one judge of elections
and one inspector of elections; the judge and the two inspectors receiving
the highest number of votes are elected, the leading candidate for inspector
being designated majority inspector while the other becomes minority
inspector.6 Prior to the opening of the polls, the minority inspector ap-
1. The scope of the following materials on illegal election practices is limited to
Philadelphia. But aside from minor variations arising from differences between the
election laws of Pennsylvania and those of other states, the problem is present in most
other cities. Pollack, They'll Steal Your Vote, 45 NAT'L MuNIc. Rzv. 322 (1956).
2. In evaluating the material gathered from these interviews, every effort was
made to cross-check the responses with other individuals interviewed and, if possible,
with a member of the opposition party.
3. The sixth ward has a population of approximately 1,000; the thirty-fifth ward,
195,000. PHILADELPHIA CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, PUBLIC INVORMATION BULLETIN
No. 6-c (Sept. 1955).
4. Committee of Seventy, Election Calendar (1957).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2671 (Purdon 1956).
6. Ibid.
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points the clerk of elections. 7 Since it is practically certain that the minority
inspector will appoint a person who is of the same party, an election board
will consist of two members of each major party. Selection of the board
in this manner theoretically insures that the election will be conducted in
accordance with law since each party's representatives will presumably
keep the other's under surveillance. Although the district judge of elections
and the board are responsible for enforcement of the election laws,8 the
Election Code provides for the additional safeguard of watchers. 9
Watchers, and members of the board, all of whom must be residents of the
district,10 are the only persons allowed in the polling place other than the
voter."
When an individual enters a polling place to vote, he is asked to sign
a voter's certificate. This signature is compared with the signature on his
registration card held by the clerk in the district register. If it appears
to be genuine, he is allowed to enter the voting booth and vote.' 2  Before
he does so, an election officer may instruct him on how to operate the
machine by using authorized diagrams or a model voting machine. If the
voter asks for instructions after he has entered the booth but before the
curtain is closed, an election officer may comply with the request provided
he does not "... request, suggest or seek to persuade or induce any such
elector to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate. ,, 18
But the officer is not permitted inside the booth after the curtain is closed.
14
No person in the polling place is allowed to solicit voters for a party or a
candidate, and the posting of campaign literature is forbidden.' 5
Those voters who are illiterate or have a physical disability, and are so
registered, may have another person enter the voting booth and assist them
in voting. The judge of elections is required to keep a record of the electors
who receive assistance, the names of the persons furnishing the assistance
and the reasons for the assistance.1
6
7. Id. § 2674.
8. Id. §3 2677-79; Commonwealth v. Grear, 168 Pa. Super. 32, 76 A.2d 491 (1950).
9. Each candidate can appoint two watchers in a primary, and each political party
can appoint three watchers in a general election. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2687 (a)
(Purdon 1956). A candidate in a primary or a party in a general election can have only
one watcher in the polling place at any given time. Id. § 2687(b). If the electors of a
division feel that additional protection is needed, a common pleas court, on petition of
five resident electors of a division, will appoint two overseers to' serve as additional
deterrents to violations of the Election Code. Id. § 2685.
10. Id. §§ 2672, 2687(b).
11. Id. §3 3060(a), (d).
12. Id. § 3050(a).
13. Id. §3 3056(a), (b).
14. Ibid.
15. Id. § 3060(c).
16. Id. § 3058. Election officers who permit unlawful assistance are subject to a fine
not exceeding $1,000, or to undergo an imprisonment of not more than one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court. Id. § 3531. A judge of elections who fails to keep
and return a record of assisted voters is subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, or to undergo imprisonment of not less than two months nor more than two
years, or both. Id. § 3532. The code also provides penalties of a fine of up to one thou-
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To enforce the sanctity of the polling place, the Election Code also
prohibits bribery,17 intimidation,' perjury19 and tampering with voting
machines.20 Penalties for violations of the various provisions of the code
range from one month 2 ' to five years2 2 and/or a fine ranging from one
hundred 2 to one thousand dollars; 24 disenfranchisement for four years is
automatic upon conviction for violation of the Election Code 25 and con-
viction of a candidate disqualifies him from holding any office in the future30
County Board of Elections
Five elected county commissioners, constituting the County Board
of Elections, are charged with overall responsibility for the conduct and
supervision of elections. 27  The board selects and equips polling places,
supplies all election equipment, and stores, examines and prepares voting
machines for elections.28 When it is necessary for a polling place to have
more than one voting machine, the board appoints a machine inspector for
each additional machine.2 9 It also issues watchers' certificates and is respon-
sible for instructing district election officers in their duties30
The Registration Commission
Registration of voters in Philadelphia is the responsibility of a hi-
partisan five-member commission appointed by the governor.3 1 No more
than three members of the Commission can belong to the same political
party,3 2 a further indication of the reliance placed by the Election Code on
bipartisan representation to prevent dishonesty. The Commission supplies
each polling place with a list of qualified voters and is responsible for
sand dollars, or imprisonment of up to one year, or both for an elector to allow some-
one to illegally assist him. The person who renders the illegal assistance is subject to
the same penalty. Id. § 3530. Guilty knowledge is not a necessary ingredient of the mis-
demeanor. Commonwealth v. Fine, 166 Pa. Super. 109, 70 A.2d 677 (1950).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3539 (Purdon 1956).
18. Id. 8 3547.
19. Id. 8 3502.
20. Id. § 3518.
21. Id. §§ 3503, 3505, 3507, 3508.
22. Id. § 3523.
23. Id. § 3509.
24. See, e.g., id. §§ 3510, 3514-18.
25. Id. § 3552.
26. Id. § 3551.
27. Id. § 2641.
28. Id. 88 2642(b), (c).
29. Id. 8§ 2642 (d), 2674.
30. Id. 88 2642(e), (f).
31. Id. 88 623-3(a), (b).
32. Id. § 623-3(b).
19571
282 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
k~eping the lists accurate and up-to-date.3 To identify persons who have
died or moved, it is authorized to use mail checks which request the elector
to report any inaccuracies in his name or address,3 4 and to employ house-to-
ho, use inspectors. As a further safeguard against "phantom" voting
in the names of people who are dead, incarcerated, or who have moved, any
qualified elector may petition the Commission to strike off the names of
improperly registered persons3 6
Following each election, the Commission is directed to compare the
signatures on voting certificates with those on the district register of each
district and to report any indications of fraud to the district attorney.
37
Committee of Seventy
The Committee of Seventy is a privately financed nonpartisan civic
group that is active in most political matters concerning Philadelphia. On
election day, the Committee employs college students to act as roving
watchers to detect election frauds. These persons are without statutory
atiJhority to enter a polling place other than to vote at their own polling
place. 8 Complaints of illegal election practices that are received by the
Committee are forwarded to these workers who attempt to check on them.
C mplaints that are substantiated and other illegal activities that are dis-
covered by the Committee after election day are forwarded to the district
attorney's office.39
VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE
What happens in a polling place on election day is fully understandable
only when viewed in the context of local politics during the remainder of the
year.40 In each of the 1500 districts in Philadelphia each party elects two
co)mitteemen. These individuals, and the ward leader they elect, act as
ui;official conduits through which residents of the district express their
grevances to the city and seek information or services from the city or
other agencies. On call at all times, the committeeman may be asked, for
33. Once a voter has registered, he does not have to do so again unless he changes
his address or fails to vote for a two-year period. Id. §§ 623-21, 623-40.
34. Id. § 623-32.
.35. Id. § 623-33.
36. Id. § 623-35. If a petition is filed, a hearing is held and the Commission is to
caxtiel the registration if the petition is justified. Id. § 623-36.
37. Id. § 623-39(c).
38. Cf. id. §§ 2672, 2685, 2687(b), 2811 (3).
39. See text and notes at notes 45, 46, 47, and 50 infra. For a history of this or-
ganization, see Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 23, 1957, p. 43.
40. The information reported in text was gathered from interviews with people
active in politics. See text following note 1 supra. Material written on this subject in
thq past includes ERvIN, THE MAGISTRATES' CouRTs or PHILADELPHIA 94-101, 105-08,
140 (1931); KURTZMAN, METrHODS o CONTROLLING Vows IN PHILADELPHIA (1935);
MWIALE, THE ITALIAN VOTE IN PHILADELPHIA BErWEEN 1928 AND 1946, at 102, 106,
107-09 (1950); O'Neil, Philadelplia: Where Patience is a Vice, in OUR FAIR CITY 64
(Allen ed. 1947); MLLv., THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS WITH SPECIAL
R.EERENCE TO PHILADELPHIA SINCE 1932, at 303-26 (1945) ; SALTER, Boss RULE; POR-
TRAITS IN CITY POLITICS (1935).
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example, to "fix" or reduce the fine on a traffic ticket or summons,"1
"speak" to a magistrate before whom the voter will be appearing in a civil
or criminal case, act as an intermediary between a member of the voters
family and a state senator in regard to a senatorial scholarship, or prepare
and expedite a request to the city for some kind of permit. Having used
his influence on behalf of his constituents, the committeeman or ward leader
expects repayment. The day of payment occurs twice a year: primary elec-
tion in the spring and general election in the fall.
Illegal Assistance
It has been estimated that approximately 100,000 people in Philadel-
phia lose their franchise each year through election frauds.2 Most of these
votes are manipulated by district politicians who render illegal assistance
by accompanying the voter into the polling booth and pulling the levers.
In some of these cases the voter may have accepted a bribe. In the large
majority of cases, however, the voter allows assistance for other reasons.
He may feel indebted to the district politician for his past "services," 4
he may be uncertain as to the operation of the machine, or he may merely
not want to affront his neighbor, the committeeman, by refusing his as-
sistance. Aggravating the situation, typically, is the elector's ignorance of
the candidates and issues involved, particularly in a primary, which renders
him more susceptible to offers of aid.4
Not all sections of Philadelphia have the same socio-economic status;
field investigation suggests that the lower the socio-economic level of the
neighborhood, the more prevalent are illegal assistance and other violations
of the Election Code. The river-to-river (east-west) area between Lehigh
Avenue, twenty-seven city blocks north of Market Street (center city), and
Snyder Avenue, twenty-one blocks south of Market Street, was found to
contain the so-called "controlled" wards,45 where the vote is, to a large
degree, determined by the illegal activities of local politicians. In some elec-
tion districts in this area, it is unusual for an elector to vote unassisted ina
41. The Evening Bulletin, March 15, 1957, p. 3, gol. 6, has a story about the "new
location" to which politicians were to bring traffic tickets to be "fixed." In recent
months a new traffic court procedure has been inaugurated which is reputedly 'Ifix
proof." Until this system has been in operation for several months, politicians are re-
serving judgment on its effectiveness.
42. This was an estimate by a federal grand jury. Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 1,
1956, p. 7, col 1.
43. See text at notes 40 and 41 supra.
44. Since a voter in a general election can pull either the Democratic or Republi-
can lever and vote for all the party's candidates, it is not normally necessary to vote
for or check on him unless the district politician has orders to "cut" a party candidate
or feels the voter is untrustworthy or may make a mistake. It is at the primary election
that illegal assistance is necessary if the committeeman is to deliver the vote that is
expected of him. If the committeeman or ward leader delivers the expected vote, he
looks forward to a reward of a government job or, if he is ambitious and has enough
voter appeal outside the bounds of his district or ward, a nomination for an elective
office.
45. The testimony of the Executive Secretary of the Committee of Seventy, a
nonpartisan civic organization, before a federal grand jury is to the same effect. Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Oct. 11, 1956, p. 6, col. 3.
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primary.46 An independent candidate, running without party support,
finds this an insurmountable obstacle because of the difficulty in securing
.enough loyal watchers who can comply with the residence requirement.
Illegal assistance is not confined to this area, however, and in primaries
it is said that there is no such thing as an "independent ward." -7
Bribery and Otlwr Violations
Although outright bribery is not prevalent through most parts of the
city, in lower socio-economic areas enough votes are bought, in important
contests, to play a decisive role in carrying a district or ward. Even in
these areas, it is often considered in bad taste to offer money to people with
steady jobs. One committeeman summed up the practice in such cases as
a matter of "buying the voter a shot of whiskey or a few cigars to show him
that you are a right guy. That's not bribery." 48 Since this rarely occurs
inside the polling place, detection is almost impossible.49 In return, the
-voter is often expected to permit another to do the actual voting for him
after he signs the voter's certificate. This, of course, requires the con-
nivance of the district election board. So also does the practice of removing
voter certificates from the district register and taking them to the residences
of voters in order to obtain their signatures so that votes may subsequently
be cast on their behalf. In the "controlled" wards the nicety of obtaining
-the proper signature is sometimes ignored and people who no longer live
in the district or who are dead or in prison on election day are "voted." 50
In sections of the city where outright bribery is deemed improper,
"workers" are hired in important contests to help bring out the party
voters. Since there is no legal maximum to the number of "workers" a
party can hire, the employment of a large number of people from large
families can accomplish the same results as bribery without violating
the Election Code.
46. A former state representative and ward leader, still active in politics, boasted
to us that if they voted for every elector in his division, and if the Committee of
Seventy (evidently he was unconcerned about the district attorney) approached every
voter the next day, the Committee would not be able to get a single person to testify
that anything illegal occured.
47. See also Temple University News, April 30, 1956, p. 1, col. 2, reporting the
.results of two polls, covering the 1955 and 1956 city primaries, in which the students
worked as volunteers for the Committee of Seventy. The students reported that a very
low percentage of people were informed about the election and also the presence of
illegal assistance.
48. Interview with committeeman, South Philadelphia ward.
49. Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 23, 1957, pp. 43, 96.
50. Interview with committeeman in forty-seventh ward; letters to district attor-
ney by Committee of Seventy on Jan. 4, 1956 and Jan. 27, 1956 pertaining to the fourth,
ninth, and thirty-sixth wards. In these letters, the names of voters who said that they
did not vote, lived in another division, or who were in prison at the time of the election
were listed. Also inclosed was a list of signatures which appeared to be forged; of
these about forty-two signatures on the voter certificates in the first division of the
ninth ward appeared to be signed by one person. See files, Committee of Seventy, Phila-
delphia, Pa. for a report that in the first division of the ninth ward, out of one hundred
and forty-five recorded voters, eighty-four were found to be fictitious names with
doubt as to ten more; in addition, the district attorney's office could not locate the dis-
trict board of elections. Up to August of 1956, no prosecutions for the above had been
reported. Files, Committee of Seventy, Philadelphia, Pa.
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THE BASIC WEAKNESS OF THE ELECTION CODE
The theory that one party will prevent the other from violating the
election laws5 1 breaks down completely in most primaries because each
party is more concerned with having its endorsed candidates receive the
nomination than with the results of the other party's primary. This con-
cern, intensified by the comparative complexity of the primary, commonly
results in each party concentrating on assisting its own voters, leaving
the opposition party free to do the same. Independent candidates with
active watchers at all polling places could presumably compensate for the
inertia of the regular organizations. But in the majority of districts it is
difficult for an independent to get watchers who will demand that their
neighbors, the members of the board of elections and the committeemen,
comply with the Election Code. Moreover, in districts where an inde-
pendent has been unable to secure watchers, increased illegal activity may
result in order to build up the vote against the independent. Not only is
organization control of the party at stake, but there is need to set an example
for those elected officials who might consider voting against the party while
in office and subsequently running as independents should the party with-
hold its endorsement.
52
In general elections each party will serve as a watchdog on the other
only if both parties are active and have strong organizations. The pendulum
in Philadelphia has swung from Republican control to Democratic; in
order to retain, or attain, patronage a number of former Republican com-
mitteemen have switched their registration and in February 1956, about
half of these people were running for the position of committeeman on the
Democratic ticket.53 Approximately fifty divisions have no elected Repub-
lican committeemen at all,5 4 and in some other districts the committeemen
appear hardly competent to enforce the Election Code. Two of those inter-
viewed, for example, were illiterates who themselves required assistance
to vote.
In important elections, some district polling places are staffed with
representatives of only one party because representatives of the other either
do not appear or refrain from any activity. On this ground level of
politics, the purchase price for a digtrict "sell-out" is not great. 55
51. Even in theory bipartisan representation is not always insured since the code
makes no provision for members of the division board of elections who change their
party affiliation after they are elected. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2671-87 (Purdon
1956).
52. E.g., results of interviews with defeated candidates for the state legislature in
South, West and North Philadelphia. See Philadelphia Bulletin, April 25, 1956, p.. 1,
col. 2, for an account of a nominee in a primary contest for the state legislature receiv-
ing two hundred and forty votes in one division and the other four candidates receiving
none. In the other thirteen divisions in the ward, no other contestant received more
than twenty votes.
53. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 26, 1956, p. 13, col. 5, reported that more than one
hundred Republican committeemen had switched their registration of whom about forty-
eight are running for committee positions on the Democratic ticket.
54. Records of the County Board of Elections of committeemen elected in April,
1956.
55. To the effect that this situation is not peculiar to Philadelphia, see Election
Frauds Can be Stopped, 45 NATL MUNIc. Rzv. 321 (1956) ; Pollack, supra note 1.
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THE FAILURE OF THE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES OF THE CODE
The Judge of Elections
It is the function of the judge of elections to see that voting and the
vote count are conducted properly.5 6 In some parts of the city, however,
the job is looked upon as an easy way to make twenty-five dollars 7 and
not as a position of responsibility. Typically, this official's name is entered
on the ballot on the recommendation of the district committeeman. Conse-
quently, the judge is often a relative of the committeeman or someone from
a family whose votes the committeeman is desirous of securing. If the
committeeman is concerned with expediting his own job of delivering
votes, it is unlikely that he will use competency, independence, or honesty
as criteria in selecting his nominee for judge of elections.58
County Board of Elections
The County Board of Elections provides and maintains election equip-
ment, certifies watchers and machine inspectors and gives instruction
annually to the election officers of the various districts. 50 A county com-
missioner who was interviewed was of the opinion that the Board's func-
tions are limited to the aforementioned duties and that violations of the
Election Code are the concern of the district attorney and the Committee
of Seventy. He further observed that while violations are numerous, they
are similar to violations of the traffic code; they can be reduced by
publicity and a sustained enforcement drive, but never be wholly eliminated.
Once the publicity and enforcement slackens, violations will be as numerous
as before.
The Election Code provides that it is the duty of the Board to:
".. .investigate election frauds, irregularities and violations of this
act, and to report all suspicious circumstances to the district at-
torney." 60
". .. inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries
and elections in the several election districts of the county to the end
that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently and uniformly
conducted." I"
The code could be interpreted to mean that the Board is to investigate
elections only in retrospect and on the basis of its findings instruct and
56. See text and note at note 8 supra.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2682(a) (Purdon 1956).
58. Few of the judges of election that we spoke to had read the Election Code
(they receive a copy of the code from the County Board of Elections) and misconcep-
tions as to the provisions of the code are not uncommon. One judge of elections in
South Philadelphia said that he permitted assistance whenever he thought that the
voter was "nervous."
59. See notes 27-30 supra; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2642(g) (Purdon 1938).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2642(i) (Purdon 1938).
61. Id. § 2642(g).
ELECTION PRACTICES IN PHILADELPHIA
issue rules to the district election boards so as to avoid future violations
of the code. But the use of such phrases in the code as to "investigate
election frauds," to "inspect systematically" and "to report all suspicious
circumstances to the District Attorney," suggests a more dynamic role on
election day itself. The Board, although unable to place a representative
within a polling place because of the code enumeration of those allowed
therein, 2 might appoint roving inspectors to check on illegal practices by
observation in the immediate vicinity of the polling places and by investi-
gating complaints telephoned to the Board.ea
The Registration Commission
One duty of the Registration Commission is to remove from the
registration lists fictitious persons and those who have moved, died, or
failed to vote in the last two years. 4 It is important that the lists not be
"padded" with such names because their presence facilitates fraudulent
voting.
The Commission claims that its margin of error has been reduced to
approximately one-half of one per cent, or 5,000 for 1,000,000 voters. To
accomplish this the Commission asserts that its investigators make a
personal canvass of highly transient areas three times a year.6a This latter
claim, however, was not substantiated by committeemen in these areas
and in January 1956 it was discovered that of 145 votes cast in the first
district of the ninth ward in the previous election, at least eighty-four had
been cast in the names of fictitious people. The district attorney's office
was also unable to locate the members of the district board of elections for
the same reason.
06
Another duty of the Registration Commission is to inspect the sig-
natures on all voting certificates to insure that they correspond with the
signatures in the registration binder. 67 It is questionable, however, whether
the inspection actually discloses forgeries because the employees of the
Commission are not handwriting experts and their examination is probably
cursory.
The District Attorney
On election day, the district attorney's office assigns fifteen to twenty
assistant district attorneys to various sections of the city. When the office
62. Id. §§ 2672, 2687(b), 2685, 2811(3).
63. Absent a clearer statutory mandate or voluntary assumption of these duties, it
may be difficult to compel the Board of Elections to undertake these duties. In Dorris
v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 474, 478, 100 A2d 924, 927 (1953), it was held that a county chair-
man of a political party had no legal standing as an individual or in his representative
capacity to maintain mandamus proceedings against county commissioners to inspect
systematically the conduct of elections, because mandamus is not the proper remedy to
compel a general course of official conduct or a long series of continuous acts to be
performed under varying conditions.
64. See text at notes 32-35 supra.
65. Interview with Chairman of the Registration Commission, July, 1956.
66. See note 50 supra.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 623-39(c) (Purdon 1938).
19571
288 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
receives a complaint, the assistant district attorney assigned to that area is
dispatched and is usually able to settle the dispute on the spot. Accord-
ing to the district attorney's office, there are only five or ten districts in
which serious violations are attempted, and this system is a sufficient
deterrent.
What apparently occurs when an assistant district attorney arrives at
a polling place is that illegal practices are temporarily discontinued. Mean-
while the complaining witness has been persuaded to forget the incident.
The effectiveness of the policy of attempting to settle election-day disputes
on the spot may also be questioned. A Democratic watcher reported that in
his district there was illegal assistance and bribery on a wholesale scale. The
judge of elections, who was drunk, had cut a hole in the curtain and when
he pushed an elderly lady out of the polling place, a complaint was made
to the district attorney's office. The assistant district attorney who arrived
took the judge of elections to one side, said something to him, and left after
telling everyone present to "take it easy." 68
The effectiveness of the Election Code also depends on the extent to
which discovered violators are prosecuted. Although there are many ob-
stacles to prosecution of illegal election practices, because of intimidation
and social pressures on witnesses, the district attorney's office has been
fortunate enough to have a nonpartisan civic group obtain evidence of
vote frauds for its office. 69 A check of the bills of indictment returned by
the grand jury from January 1, 1955 to July 19, 1956 70 revealed that only
two bills had been ieturned for election violations. Neither of these has
been prosecuted. The professional politician at work on election day is not
fearful of the district attorney's office.
The United States Attorney
In an election involving a federal office, every qualified elector has a
federal right to vote 71 and to have the vote honestly counted.72 Under
two federal statutes, one providing penalties for deprivation of rights under
color of law 3 and the other punishing a conspiracy against the rights of
citizens, 74 the federal government has power to prosecute most vote frauds
in these elections. Indictments under these statutes have been sustained
for not counting votes honestly,7 5 stuffing a ballot box, 76 and rendering
illegal assistance to a voter.77
68. November, 1955 election.
69. See text at notes 37 to 39 supra.
70. Covering two general and two primary elections.
71. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) ; United States v. Classic. 313
U.S. 299 (1941) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
72. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). The source of this right is
the section of the Federal Constitution, which pertains to the election of members of
Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1952).
75. See note 73 .nepra.
76. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
77. Fields v. United States, 228 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1955).
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Congress has power, based on the fifteenth amendment, to legislate in
regard to purely local elections in aid of qualified electors wrongly refused
the franchise because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.7s
This power has been exercised by a statute giving a qualified elector who
has been refused the right to vote because of his race a civil cause of
action.79 In addition, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides a source of jurisdiction over local elections in those cases
involving state action. Congress, in enacting a statute prohibiting depriva-
tion of rights under color of law,80 would seem to have exercised this
jurisdiction in such a manner as to authorize prosecution of election officials
for actions depriving a voter of his franchise."' However, difficult evi-
dentiary problems stand in the path of convictions. For example, federal
courts would not be disposed to construe every violation of a state law by
a state official as a denial of equal protection."- It would be necessary to
show that in violating the Election Code, the election officer intentionally
or purposefully took this action with a specific intent to deprive the victim
of a federally protected right.83  The difficulty of sustaining this burden is
at once apparent because professional politicians at work on election day
are concerned with the number of votes they can obtain and have no
specific intent to deprive any individual of his right of the franchise. In
addition, even if this burden can be met successfully, a watcher, who
arguably may not be acting under "color of law," and a person unofficially
in the polling place, who renders illegal assistance, would not be subject
to federal jurisdiction.
Assuming that federal jurisdiction is available only in elections includ-
ing federal offices, the potential of keeping elections honest is present.
Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years, and
it is likely that zealous prosecutions for vote frauds would be a sufficient
deterrent to professional politicians not only in Philadelphia, but nationally.
Thus far, however, the federal government has generally left policing of
elections up to the states as a matter of policy.
78. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
79. Rzv. STAT. 2004 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1952). The federal attorney inter-
viewed was of the opinion that this is the extent of federal jurisdiction in a local
election.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952), protects those rights affirmatively granted by the
United States Constitution and those rights secured from state interference. United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325 (1941).
81. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325 (1941) (action of state election
official violating the state election laws is action taken "under color of" state law). The
statute punishing a conspiracy against the rights of citizens has been construed to pro-
tect from interference only those rights affirmatively granted by the United States
Constitution. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). Since the right to vote in
a purely local election is a state-created right, Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7
(1943), federal jurisdiction would not be obtainable under this statute.
82. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1943).
83. Screws v. United States. 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The prevalence of election frauds in Philadelphia, especially illegal
assistance, strongly indicates that the Election Code has not been effective.
Yet relatively clean elections are possible, as was demonstrated in the presi-
dential election of 1956 when the federal grand jury was sitting on election
day and the Committee of Seventy had a large number of roving inspectors
on the streets.84 Such preventive measures may not be feasible, however,
at every future city election, particularly at primaries. Changes in the
present code therefore appear necessary.
Post-election prosecution for violation of the Election Code is an in-
adequate deterrent to such conduct. To be effective, the code must estab-
lish a means of preventing fraud at the polling place. The present reliance
on surveillance by each party of the other's conduct fails to satisfy this need,
particularly at the primary. Nor does the judge of elections seem able to
secure compliance with the code's requirements. However, this inability
is more a product of the method by which he is selected than it is a weak-
ness inherent in the concept of a judge of elections itself. A sincere attempt
to enfore the code by a judge of elections familiar with its provisions would
eliminate much of the present improper conduct, especially the rendering of
illegal assistance. Herein, then, lies a possible avenue of reform.
Making the judge of elections an elective office insures that the local
majority committeeman's nominee will fill the post. The individual chosen
is open to two kinds of pressure: pressure from the committeeman to
whom he owes his "appointment" and pressure resulting from any attempt
to enforce the code against his neighbors. And, of course, if illegal activity
is contemplated, it is unlikely that the committeeman will select a nominee
likely to be able to resist such pressures.
An alternative is to amend the code to allow appointment of judges of
election on a civil service basis, i.e., call for applicants, test them for general
aptitude, and appoint those demonstrating the greatest ability to serve
regularly at elections. Certain minimum standards, particularly freedom
from a criminal record and possibly a high school education would be
desirable. Those selected would then be given a course of instruction, more
comprehensive than presently given,8 5 in the Election Code and would be
assigned to districts other than that of their residence, the assignment to
vary with each election.8 6 This divorcement from committeeman and
neighborhood would appear to reduce the pressures presently on a judge
of elections. In addition, selection by a more objective method would hope-
fully raise the level of competency of those holding the office.
84. Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 23, 1957, p. 43.
85. In interviewing judges of election, complaints were made that the one ihstruc-
tion period allotted to them was insufficient to teach them how to run a polling place.
86. It is thought that the purpose behind the residency requirement is that a resi-
dent board will recognize and stop voting by "floaters," i.e., persons who go from dis-
trict to district and cast votes in the names of other persons. Since the remaining three
members of the election board would continue to be residents of the district, this pro-
posal would not thwart this purpose.
ELECTION PRACTICES IN PHILADELPHIA
Naturally, the proposal has certain disadvantages. Chief among them
would be increased cost and administrative detail.8 7 However, it is believed
that these could be minimized and that the gain in terms of more honest
elections would offset them.
Two less drastic alternatives might yield certain of the advantages of
this proposal at a reduced cost. The first of these would require amend-
ment of the Election Code to permit the County Board of Elections to have
inspectors present in the polling places. The Board should then be placed
under civil service (probably a desirable course in any event) and given
authority to hire inspectors in the same manner as suggested for judges of
election. These inspectors, under the power of the Board to inspect the
conduct of primaries and elections, could be assigned as watchers where
needed or used as roving inspectors. A second alternative, which could
also be used to supplement the prior suggestions, would amend the resi-
dency requirement for watchers so as to permit representation of inde-
pendent candidates and civic groups such as the Committee of Seventy in
the polling places. 8 Such representatives might be expected to scrutinize
more closely the activities of the regular party organizations.
The first of these alternatives does not promise complete coverage of
polling places, nor does it place reliance on the individual theoretically in
charge of the polling place. The chief advantage of this suggestion would
be the lower cost as compared to the expense of advertising, testing, and
selecting of judges of election necessary for complete coverage of the city's
polling places. The second alternative, involving no additional cost to the
city, would have the same disadvantage as to scope of coverage since the
attainment of its desired purpose would depend on the self interest of inde-
pendent candidates and the judgment of independent civic organizations
as to which polling places need additional supervision.
87. Among these would be advertising for people to fill the positions, preparing
and administering a test and training those persons who are selected. Probably the cost
of advertising would not be great since it is likely that the local newspapers and civic
groups would be willing to actively assist the county board.
88. For statutes not requiring that either the division election officials or watchers
be residents of the division in which they serve, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 46, § 18-6
(Smith-Hurd 1956) ; MIcH. STAT. AwN. § 6.1677 (1956) ; N.Y. ELECTION LAv § 39(3).
Because of the dearth of investigative material on the subject, it is not known whether
those states not having a residency requirement have a lower incidence of violations of
their election codes. However, since statutory commands alone will not insure honest
elections, the machinery to prevent election code violations should be available to any
interested party, e.g., an independent candidate or a civic group, who is likely to use it.
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